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The infinite judgement has long been forgotten and yet, as I am about to 
demonstrate, it may be urgent to revive it for its critical and productive potential. 
An infinite judgement is neither analytic nor synthetic; it does not produce logical 
truths, nor true representations, but it establishes the genetic conditions of real 
objects and the concepts appropriate to them. It is through infinite judgements 
that we reach the principle of transcendental logic, in the depths of which all 
reality can emerge in its material and sensible singularity, making possible all 
generalization and formal abstraction. I will begin with a short historical 
introduction to infinite judgement that will allow us to understand the central role 
of Kant and, above all, the post-Kantians Salomon Maïmon and Johann G. 
 
1 Originally published as Anna Longo, "Jugements infinis et logique transcendantale," in Le 
paradoxe de la finitude (2019). 
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Fichte. I will subsequently explain how Hegel finds himself forced to reduce this 
judgement to non-sense in order to render formal logic an organon and make 
accessing the absolute possible. To conclude, I will demonstrate how Gilles 
Deleuze returns to the infinite judgement and transcendental logic to refuse the 
Hegelian dialectic, which reveals his political position to be aligned with the 
necessity of thinking an alternative to the formalism that dominates the present. 
One of the first accounts of the operation that would come to be called 
‘infinite judgement’ can be found in On Interpretation,2 where Aristotle catalogues 
the parts of speech, recognizing that expressions like ‘not-man’ or ‘not-healthy’ 
cannot be reduced to negations.3 In fact, a negation such as “Socrates is not a 
man,” signifies that the subject is deprived of the predicate, whereas if we say 
“Socrates is a not-man” we affirm something undefined about the subject. 
According to Aristotle, expressions such as not-man are indefinite names: “‘not-
man’ is not a name, nor is there any correct name for it. It is neither a phrase nor 
a negation. Let us call it an indefinite name [onoma aoriston].”4 The expression ‘not-
man’ indicates the opening of the subject to infinite predicates with the exception 
of those relating to man.  
The medieval philosophers would make extensive use of these indefinite 
nouns. For a complete catalogue, we turn to the exhaustive work of Daniel Heller-
Roazen.5 I limit myself here to signaling the use made by Moises Maïmonide in 
The Guide for the Perplexed,6 which would extend a certain influence over Kant and 
Salomon Maïmon. A philosopher and rabbi of the eleventh century, Maïmonide 
used the indefinite noun to indicate divine attributes, knowing that, on the one 
hand, one could not suggest that God was characterized by the same qualities 
that defined His creatures and that, on the other hand, one could not think of 
Him as deficient, because a perfect being cannot lack anything. Thus, the solution 
 
2 Aristotle, “De interpretation,” trans. J.L. Ackrill in Aristotle, The Complete Works: The Revised Oxford Translation, 
ed. Jonathan Barnes, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1984, vol. 1,  
3 Translators’ note: In Longo’s original French, infinite judgements are typically expressed 
with the predicate ‘non-,’ e.g. ‘non-sage,’ ‘non-homme.’ Following the precedent established by 
Ackrill and other translators of Aristotle, we have chosen to render these compound modifiers 
with the predicate ‘not-.’   
4Ibid., §2, 6a30-16a31, p. 3. 
5 Daniel Heller-Roazen, No One’s Ways: An Essay on Infinite Naming, New York, Zone Books, 2017. 
6 Maimonides, The Guide of the Perplexed, trans. Shlomo Pines, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1963. 
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was to consider the attributes of God and the attributes of finite beings as 
ambiguous homonyms, which is to say that divine qualities and human qualities 
share the same definition but are expressed differently. It follows, for example, 
that a man may be wise, that a man may not be wise, but the Creator is not-wise: 
this signifies that a finite being can be characterized by the attribute of wisdom, 
he can be deficient of it, whereas the infinite being possesses wisdom in a 
completely different way than men. That God is not-wise means that God is wise 
in a way that we cannot understand. The infinite being is not-wise, not-living, 
not-powerful, etc., and this means that He is the origin of these qualities which 
we find in reality, rather than to signify that these apply to Him. Kant would 
remember these reflections when he discussed the idea of the ens realissimum as the 
basis of all real determination.   
INFINITE JUDGEMENT AND KANT  
Kant applies the concept of infinite judgement in “Transcendental Dialectics”7 
when he considers the complete determination of any possible object. Here it is 
not a question of logical determination, which is to say relying on the principle of 
non-contradiction to establish that the negation of a predicate implies the 
affirmation of its opposite, but of transcendental determination, which concerns 
the matter or the content of the judgement. To explain it simply, when we say, 
“the apple is red” we affirm that the subject possesses a certain quality; when we 
say, “the apple is not red” we maintain that the subject is lacking that quality. 
There exists a certain number of possible predicates to characterize the apple—
for example, “the apple is green,” “the apple is sweet,” “the apple is ripe”—that 
can also be negated; for example, “the apple is not green,” “the apple is not ripe,” 
“the apple is not sweet.” Yet the sum of all the qualities that could characterize 
the apple, without being present all at the same time (if the apple is currently red 
it is not green, but it may have been green in the past), constitute the apple’s 
“complete determination,” which is to say the sum of its possible determinations, 
of the predicates which one could ascribe to it in judgement. This implies that 
there are also some impossible judgements, for example, “the apple is straight,” 
“the apple is not straight,” “the apple is depressed,” “the apple is not depressed.” 
 
7 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. and ed. Paul Guyer and Allan Wood, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1998. 
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To explain why only certain attributes can be applied to an object in valid 
syntheses, it is necessary to consider the apple from a material perspective, which 
is to say as the sum of its possible qualities. Yet the sum of the apple’s possible 
determinations does not correspond to the sum of possible qualities, for example, 
of the table or of Socrates. In particular, the apple can in no case be straight, nor 
a bipedal, feathered animal: the apple is therefore not-straight, not-bipedal, and 
this does not mean that it is lacking the qualities that could characterize it in a 
different moment, but that these qualities could never apply to it. The reality of 
the apple, as the sum of possible determinations, is thus opposed to the reality of 
objects which are straight, bipedal, or feathered. The proposition “the apple is 
not-bipedal” makes sense in terms of transcendental logic, and this means that 
the predicate is not part of the complete determination of the apple. Therefore, 
the main objective for Kant is to find the basis that legitimizes judgements with 
respect to content, which is to say from the perspective of transcendental logic. 
This basis is the totality of reality; i.e., the sum of all possible qualities, with 
regards to each particular being, is a limitation: the reality of the apple is the set 
of determinations that we can ascribe to its particular reality as opposed to the 
reality of the table; the latter determinations constitute what we could, at first 
glance, consider another subset of total reality.   
In this framework, Kant explains that “logical negation, which is indicated 
solely by the little word ‘not,’ is never properly attached to a concept, but rather 
to its relation to it in a judgement, and therefore it is far from sufficient to 
designate a concept in regard to its contents.”8 Therefore in saying ‘not-mortal,’ 
we don’t suppose to characterize any particular being but, quite simply, to 
indicate the sphere of beings that are not mortal. Considered from the 
transcendental point of view, negation does not indicate the privations of a 
predicate (in this case mortality), but affirms, in a positive manner, the totality of 
the not-mortal being:  
A transcendental negation on the contrary, signifies non-being itself, and is opposed 
to transcendental affirmation, which is something, the concept of which in itself 
already expresses a being, and hence is called reality (thinghood), because through 
it alone, and only so far as it reaches, are objects Something (things).9  
 
8 Ibid., p. 555. 
9 Ibid., p. 555. 
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Thus, in transcendental logic, the negation (not-) is an infinite judgement that, 
in affirming the reality of a sphere of being that does not fall within a given 
concept, establishes, in some way, the possibility of formal negation. In 
transcendental logic, the ‘not-’ affirms, in a positive manner, the reality of all that 
is not included within the predicate, for example, the reality of all not-mortal 
beings. In a certain manner, “X is not-mortal” does not indicate just that X is not 
mortal and that X is eternal, but it affirms the existence of a not-mortal reality to 
which subject X belongs. Consequently, transcendental negation indicates the 
infinite matter that extends beyond the limits of the matter particular to a given 
concept: “All true negations are then nothing but limits.”10 Finite logical 
determination thus finds its basis in the Idea of an infinite reality with respect to 
which each determination is a limitation. Likewise, we can consider each logical 
judgement as the basis of a disjunctive syllogism that implies the Idea of the 
totality of all the possible predicates against which each determined thing should 
be compared: the complete knowledge of an object thus returns to the conception 
of its own limits—that is, as cut off from the totality of reality from which it is 
excluded. To revisit our example, the logical judgement “X is not mortal” finds 
its basis in the existence of a reality consisting of mortal and not-mortal beings 
and affirms the membership of the object to one of the two sets. From that point 
on, “The thoroughgoing determination of every thing rests on the limitation of 
this All of reality, constituted by reality, in that some of it is ascribed to the thing 
and the rest excluded from it.”11 Kant tells us that the Idea of this reality 
foundation, as the totality of possible determination, corresponds to the ens 
realissimum, God as supreme reality. It is, however, an Idea rather than something 
existing, “a fiction,”12 the ideal is, in this sense, the totality from whence each 
thing draws its possibility. However, Kant explains that the ens realissimum must 
not be considered a set, but rather as the foundation of the determination of 
limited beings, thus “The derivation of all other possibility from this original 
being, strictly speaking, also cannot be regarded as a limitation of its highest 
reality and as a division, as it were, of it (…) Rather the highest reality would 
 
10 Ibid., p. 555.  
11 Ibid., p. 556.  
12 Ibidem. 
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ground the possibility of all things as a ground and not a sum total; and the 
manifoldness of the former rests not on the limitation of the original being itself, 
but on its complete consequences.”13 From this point of view, infinite judgement 
does not exactly correspond to a limitation in a set made up of parts, “even 
though we represented it in such a way at the beginning in our first crude 
outline,”14 but to the seizure of this foundation which is both the limit of the real 
condition of all determination or knowledge of objects. Kant seems here to 
indicate a genetic perspective according to which the determination of real 
objects follows from an infinite, indeterminate being, which we could define as 
the not-being that is the source of the finite being of real entities. We could say 
that the ens realissimum, which, for Kant, is an Idea of reason rather than an 
existing God, is not-wise, not-living, not-powerful, and that, on the other hand, 
it is necessary to think of it as the raison d’être of reality which we can determine 
to be wise, to be living, or to be powerful. Infinite judgement is not just an 
indefinite noun, as it was for Aristotle, it does not refer, quite simply, to the 
opening of infinite predication (complete determination), but is a true judgement 
in the framework of transcendental logic that indicates the condition of existence 
of real objects, the genetic principle of all determined reality, or the infinite 
determinable which founds the possibility of all determined reality.  
IDEAS ARE THE DIFFERENTIALS OF THOUGHT 
Familiar with the philosophy of Maïmonide and Kant, Salomon Maïmon affirms 
the priority of transcendental logic by asserting that it is the true foundation of 
general logic. This assertion is necessary if we wish to insure critical philosophy 
against the attacks of skeptics like Gottlob Ernst Schulze,15 maintaining that finite 
 
13 Ibid., p. 557. 
14 Ibidem.  
15 Aenesidemus is a German book published anonymously by Professor Gottlob Ernst Schulze of 
Helmstedt in 1792. Schulze attempted to refute the principles that Karl Leonhard Reinhold 
established in support of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason (1781). The title is a reference to 
Aenesidemus, an ancient Greek skeptic philosopher. Its complete title, in English translation, is 
Aenesidemus or Concerning the Foundations of the Philosophy of the Elements Issued by Professor Reinhold in Jena 
Together with a Defense of Skepticism against the Pretensions of the Critique of Reason (German: Aenesidemus 
oder über die Fundamente der von dem Herrn Professor Reinhold in Jena gelieferten Elementar-Philosophie. Nebst 
einer Vertheidigung des Skepticismus gegen die Anmassungen der Vernunftkritik).  
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knowledge cannot know itself without contradicting itself. In other words, for 
Maïmon, it is a question of explaining why certain concepts, rather than others 
which could produce a different representation, should be used. The fact that 
everyone agrees on particular formal conditions does not imply that they are 
necessary and that others are therefore to be excluded. Maïmon therefore 
attempts to respond to the question quid juris? [which law?] with respect to the usage 
of formal concepts and his strategy consists of showing the rules which force the 
imagination to determine itself in accordance with the real. In this way, we do 
not marvel at the fact that a given concept should be adapted to the matter which 
subsumes it, but it suffices merely to recognize the ideal reasons that oblige the 
faculties to construct objects in a certain manner. Maïmon proposes geometric 
examples: the knowledge that we have of a circle is perfect, since the figure is 
built, independently of empirical data, following an ideal rule according to which 
the circle is the figure produced by drawing, from a single point, infinite equal 
lines in all directions. Although the imagination cannot draw an infinite number 
of lines, it uses an efficient rule of construction; it rotates a segment around a 
vertex and thus obtains the image of a circle that we can perfectly understand 
according to its internal connections, for example the link between the diameter 
and the circumference. The knowledge that we have of a circle is thus justified by 
the rules of construction for the object given by the Idea: here, we are not 
applying concepts in a heterogeneous matter, but noting internal connections 
within an object that we construct in a manner conforming to rules of thought. 
Now, according to Maïmon, it should be shown that, for any perceptible object, 
the ideal rules of construction justify the usage of concepts, i.e., the recognition 
of certain internal connections within the object and between different objects. 
Therefore, we would explain why an apple can be red or sweet but cannot be 
straight (it is not-straight) by demonstrating that the qualities that one is supposed 
to predicate depend, in fact, on the ideal rules of construction of the object.  
For Maïmon, it was thus a question of ensuring the validity of concepts a priori 
if knowledge limits itself to what is represented in these judgements. Thus, picking 
up the philosophy of Leibniz, he maintains that the imagination constructs its 
objects via an operation of integration based on an ideal differential ratio. In 
mathematics, differentials are tangential equations of the curve which describe 
the behavior of the sought function through the operation of integration. As such, 
a determined object in consciousness would be constructed by a similar integral 
operation of infinitely minute impressions, the synthesis of which is based on the 
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ratio dx/dy, which constitutes the rule of internal determination. Now, 
differentials do not solely determine the construction of objects but also the 
relations between objects; that is, differentials prescribe the application of 
categories. As Maïmon explains: “Sensibility thus provides the differentials to a 
determined consciousness; out of them, the imagination produces a finite 
(determined) object of intuition; out of the relations of these different differentials, 
which are its objects, the understanding produces the relation of the sensible 
objects arising from them.”16 Maïmon therefore takes up the Leibnizian 
metaphysics of calculation, adapting it to critical philosophy and considering 
differential ratios as Ideas; “they are mere limit concepts [Gränzbegriffe], which we 
can approach nearer and nearer to, but never reach,”17 so “these differentials of 
objects are the so-called noumena; but the objects themselves arising from them 
are the phenomena.”18 Ideas are the unknowable conditions of knowledge, in 
other words, the infinitesimal relations that determine the construction of 
phenomena in consciousness. In this way, Maïmon strives to legitimize synthetic 
judgements a priori without contradicting critical philosophy and the limits it 
imposes on knowledge. Considered as differential ratios, noumena are not that 
which lies beyond the limits of representation, they are not the dogmatic ‘cause’ 
of empirical data, but rather the degree zero of representation. Therefore, for 
Maïmon, noumena are not ‘the other’ in relation to phenomena, but are the 
originary limit of all phenomenal consciousness, the ratio dx/dy approaching 
zero. We could say that Ideas, as the genetic limit of representation, constitute the 
true a priori of knowledge, an a priori that is the condition of real experience, i.e., 
the designation of a perceptible matter containing the rules of synthesis in 
consciousness rather than possible experience. This produces a synthesis which 
operates according to standards specific to a preconstituted consciousness. 
According to Maïmon, “the understanding does not subject something given a 
posteriori to its a priori rules; rather it lets it arise in accordance with these rules”19; 
these rules, through which perceptible data is produced, are the ideal differential 
 
16 Salomon MaÏmon, Essay on Transcendental Philosophy, trans. Merten Reglitz, ed. Nick Midgley, Henry 
Somers-Hall, Alistair Welchman and Merten Reglitz, London, Continuum 2010, p. 21. 
17 Ibid., footnote I, p. 21. 
18 Ibid., p. 21. 
19 Ibid., p. 48.  
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ratios.  
Now, we have access to some of these ideal ratios, like the principles of 
mathematics or geometric entities, which is obvious since we build geometric 
figures intuitively without needing any perceptual information to be provided: we 
build mathematic beings in our imagination by allowing them to form from the 
internal ratios of determination that we know and, for that reason, a perfect 
knowledge of these entities is, for us, accessible. However, since our 
understanding is limited, we do not have access to differentials for the production 
of matter corresponding to perceptible things, which are available only to an 
infinite understanding. Maïmon thus considers himself obliged to assume the 
fiction of infinite intellect, for which perceptible objects are built completely a 
priori like mathematical objects, in order to justify the synthesis of given 
impressions operating in finite consciousness. He presumes that Ideas 
corresponding to perceptible objects, that is, the differential rules of their 
construction, are only accessible to the infinite mind, which recognizes each 
object as completely determined, while our finite understanding represents them 
through an imperfect, or incomplete, synthesis of imagination. Therefore, to 
legitimize this imaginary synthesis, it is imperative that:   
We assume an infinite understanding (at least as an idea), for which the forms are 
at the same time objects of thought, I or that produces out of itself all possible kinds 
of connections and relations of things (the ideas). Our understanding is just the 
same, only in a limited way.20 
This implies, in part, that the finite knowledge at our disposal can only be 
justified by the hypothesis of an infinite knowledge, but also that infinite 
knowledge is not other than ours; it is a question rather of limitation, of the 
unconscious, of degree zero. In this sense, we could say that infinite 
understanding is not beyond finite understanding, but rather like a non-thought 
in relation to thought, which, naturally, does not signify a relation of opposition 
or negation. Thus, infinite understanding could be indicated by an infinite 
judgement like the limit, in the mathematical sense, of finite understanding. The 
relationship between infinite understanding and finite understanding could be 
exemplified by the ratio of a circle and an inscribed polygon: the latter tends 
 
20 Ibid., p. 38. 
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towards the identity of the former (as the number of sides approaches infinity). It 
is important to note that infinite judgement here expresses a relation of non-
identity; the circle and the polygon are not identical but neither do they share a 
relationship of contradiction or exclusion: they are identical at infinity or they are 
not-identical. Here, we are not considering the logical relation between finite 
understanding and infinite understanding, which could be explained thus: given 
“finite understanding is infinite understanding,” or “finite understanding is not 
infinite understanding”; we are not dealing with the relationship between two 
concepts, but rather the relation between the determinable and the determined 
from the material or transcendental logical point of view. The determinable, as 
the condition of all determination (which for Kant was the ens realissimum), is not-
identical to the determined. Similarly, attributes of God are not-identical to the 
attributes of creatures without there being a logical negation at play. Infinite 
judgement therefore explains the genetic relationship between the determinable 
and the determined, given their non-identity or their identity at infinity. We will 
now see how this relationship of non-identity, explained by infinite judgement, 
plays a fundamental role in Fichte’s philosophy.  
FICHTE’S SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE AS TREATY OF 
TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC  
We know that Fichte was one of the rare contemporaries of Maïmon to have 
appreciated his philosophy and, we could say, to have developed it in the spirit of 
Kantianism to ensure that finite knowledge would rest on a solid foundation. It 
seems that at least two of Maïmon’s intuitions were fundamental to The Science of  
Knowledge21 (1794): (1) that transcendental science should constitute the basis of 
general logic according to a genetic perspective; (2) that the science of knowledge 
can justify the knowledge of a finite subject only in relation to the ideal of an 
absolute understanding, source, or immanent condition of all determined 
knowledge. In this respect, we will see that the first part of The Science of  
Knowledge22 concerns the principles of transcendental logic and that it is within this 
context that infinite judgement, which Fichte calls ‘thetic,’ assumes the function 
 
21 J.G. Fichte, The Science of Knowledge, trans Peter Heat and John Lachs, Cambridge, UK, 
Cambridge University Press, 1982. 
22Ibid. 
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of addressing the principle capable of legitimizing our limited knowledge without 
allowing us to exceed the limits of our constitutive finitude. “Our task is to 
discover the primordial, absolutely unconditioned first principle of all human 
knowledge. This can be neither proved nor defined, if it is to be an absolutely 
primary principle.”23 Thus begins 1794’s The Science of  Knowledge. Now, the sought 
principle is not the identity principle of general logic, A=A, which is assured. 
Nonetheless, as Fichte writes, “with respect to A itself we have thereby said 
nothing, as yet, as to whether it exists or not,”24 only that “the X that is absolutely 
posited can also be expressed as I=I; I am.”25 This is the principle of 
transcendental logic, which has a totally different meaning than the logical 
identity A=A: the latter concerns an identity, i.e., it establishes the concept A to 
be equal to itself, while the principle of transcendental logic concerns the identity 
of the act of posing a reality and that very reality. As Fichte explains, in the 
formulation I = I:   
The proposition 'I am I' has a meaning wholly different from that of 'A is A.' For 
the latter has content only under a certain condition. A is posited, it is naturally 
posited as A, as having the predicate A. But this proposition still tells us nothing as 
to whether it actually is posited, and hence whether it is posited with any particular 
predicate. Yet the proposition 'I am I' is unconditionally and absolutely valid; it is 
valid not merely in form but also in content. In it the I is posited, not conditionally, 
but absolutely, with the predicate of equivalence to itself; hence it really is posited, 
and the proposition can also be expressed as I am.26  
In this way, according to the principle of transcendental logic, “the self exists 
because it has posited itself ”27; what is affirmed is its existence, its reality, 
composed through the pure act of posing what makes the Self “at once the agent 
and the product of action; the active, and what the activity brings about; action 
and deed are one and the same.”28 This act constitutes “the unconditional 
principle of human consciousness” beyond which it is impossible to venture, since 
it involves the material institution of all possible determination. Now, it is in 
 
23 Ibid., p. 93.  
24 Ibid., p. 95. 
25 Ibid., p. 96. 
26 Ibid., p. 96. 
27 Ibid. p. 98. 
28 Ibid. p. 97. 
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relation to this content posed as absolutely existing (existing through itself) that it 
is possible to establish logical identity. Logical identity is “Demonstrated, in that 
A is A, because the self that has posited A is identical with that in which A has 
been posited; determined, in that everything that exists does so only insofar as it 
is posited in the self, and apart from the self there is nothing. No possible A in the 
above proposition (nothing) can be anything other than something posited in the 
self.”29 The principle of transcendental logic thus institutes, through an absolute 
act, the totality of possible reality that constitutes the basis of determined logical 
judgements. With regards to Kant, then, the totality of reality is not the Idea of 
the ens realissimum, but the absolute I that limits itself in a free act by defining itself 
as a finite I (the knowing subject). This absolute I, as a totality, is not an infinite 
understanding, for which all conceptual relations are immediately real, but the I 
itself where we consider it as the subject of the act by which it is posited as 
determined, as existing, or as reality. The Science of  Knowledge therefore begins by 
introducing the first principle of transcendental logic, the not-identity of absolute 
Self (that which posits) and of finite Self (that which is posited).  
The second principle of transcendental logic is real opposition, which 
establishes the second principle of general logic, that is, the contradiction A is not 
-A. This second principle of transcendental logic, which should not be confused 
with logical negation (the concept Maïmon emphasized), establishes that we 
cannot posit A without positing, at the same time, not-A: the opposition consists 
of positing a not-Self that is necessarily opposed to the Self. The not-Self therefore 
does not lack reality in relation to the Self; on the contrary, it is reality itself which 
is opposed to the reality of the Self. Here the ‘not-’ of the not-Self is an infinite 
judgement in the Kantian sense, because it affirms the reality of all that the Self 
is not. Moreover, for Kant, the principle of opposition in transcendental logic is 
the basis of logical negation: “By abstraction from the content of the material 
proposition I am, we obtained the purely formal and logical proposition 'A=A.’ 
By a similar abstraction from the assertions set forth in the preceding paragraphs, 
we obtain the logical proposition -A, ‘A is not equal to A,' which I should like to 
call the principle of opposition.”30  
 
29 Ibid., p. 100. 
30 Ibid., p. 105. 
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The third principle of transcendental logic establishes the logical principle of 
exclusive tiers, relating to the principle of limitation. The latter has the function 
of resolving the contradiction implicit within the second principle since, in effect, 
the Self and the not-Self, as real opposites, do not seem to be simultaneously 
posited in the Ego without contradiction, in other words, “the opposed self and 
not-self are to be unified thereby, to be posited together, without mutual 
elimination.”31 The solution to the problem consists in thinking the Self and the 
not-Self as opposed via reciprocal limitation, that is to say, as sharing the reality 
of the absolute Self. To this end, it is necessary to consider that to limit something 
doesn’t mean to suppress all of its reality, but only a part. Consequently, the 
absolute Self should be considered as divisible: “To limit something is to abolish 
its reality, not wholly but in part only, by negation. Thus, apart from reality and 
negation, the notion of a limit also contains that of divisibility.”32 According to the 
third principle, the Self and the not-Self are posited as sharing the totality of 
reality; “only now, in virtue of the concept thus established, can it be said of both 
that they are something.”33 In fact, “The absolute self of the first principle is not 
something (it has, and can have, no predicate); it is simply what it is, and this can 
be explained no further,”34 and it is a limitation that confers upon it a real, 
determined existence. The absolute Self, divisible before any limitation, is defined 
by Fichte as if it were not something, as a non-being, a non-existent that 
constitutes the experiential condition of determined things, that is, the Self and 
the not-Self which, in sharing indeterminate reality (not-something), are 
reciprocally determined. In short:  
The self is to be equated with, and yet opposed to, itself. But in regard to 
consciousness it is equal to itself, for consciousness is one: but in this consciousness 
the absolute self is posited as indivisible; whereas these self to which the not-self is 
opposed is posited as divisible. Hence, insofar as there is a not-self opposed to it, 
the self is itself in opposition to the absolute self.35  
It follows, and this is of the utmost importance, that the opposition of the Self 
 
31 Ibid., p. 107.  
32 Ibid., p. 108.  
33 Ibid., p. 109.  
34 Ibid., p. 109. 
35 Ibid. p. 109. 
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and the not-Self implies the difference or the not-identity of the finite Self and the 
infinite Self. Furthermore, one must understand the absolute Self as if it were a no-
something or a non-being in relation to the finite Self. It is thus the limit of the 
absolute and ideal reality of the Self (i.e. the originary act) that not only constitutes 
the bounds of the knowable, but also provides the determined matter which 
makes all knowledge possible. The originary act, as a principle of transcendental 
knowledge, can be understood as an autolimitation that permits the reciprocal 
determination of the Self and its opposite, that is, their passage to a determined 
existence.  
Now, it should be noted that in the theoretical section of The Science of  
Knowledge, where it is a question of explaining the genesis of representation, the 
Self is conceived as determined by the causality of the not-Self, while in the 
practical section the Self is conceived of as capable of self-determination (and it 
determines the not-Self in return). The problem to resolve is the contradiction 
between the absolute Self and the finite Self, i.e., the subject of knowledge: the 
finite Self is indeed supposed to be capable of self-determination (freedom), 
however its activity depends on the reality of the not-Self, which is to say, of the 
material given to perception. The finite Self is thus supposed to be free (capable 
of self-determination) and therefore to be identical to the absolute Self (which 
depends on nothing, which posits itself absolutely) but, indeed, its activity of 
synthesis is determined by the not-Self, which implies that it is not identical to the 
absolute Self (the totality of reality): the finite Self is the not-Self in relation to the 
absolute Self. It is then through an infinite judgement that this contradiction can 
be resolved in demonstrating that the absolute Self (infinite) and the intelligent 
Self (finite) “must be united, so long as opposition remains, until absolute unity is 
effected; a thing, indeed which could be brought about only by a completed 
approximation to infinity, which in itself is impossible.”36 Therefore, between the 
absolute Self and the finite Self there is an infinite identity at the limit, in the sense 
that for example, by increasing the sides of a polygon, we approach, little by little, 
a circle, without ever being able to obtain a perfect identity. Now, Fichte explains 
that the absolute Self, as perfect autonomy, constitutes the highest thesis, that 
which should be considered as the originary act of the institution of existence:  
 
36 Ibid., p. 113-114. 
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the necessity of opposing and uniting in the manner prescribed rests directly on the third 
principle; the necessity of combination in general, on the first, highest, absolutely 
unconditioned principle. The form of the system is based on the highest synthesis; that there 
should be a system at all, on the absolute thesis.37  
This thesis, which concerns the not-identity of the finite Self and of the 
absolute Self, that is, their identity at infinity, is thus the basis that legitimizes the 
possibility of synthesizing opposites. This infinite, or thetic, judgement can be 
explained as such: the finite Self is not-free or not-absolute since the condition of 
its determined reality rests on its difference, at the limit or at infinity, in relation 
to the unknowable, indeterminate reality of the absolute Self. That ‘the Self is 
free’ is therefore a thetic judgement: “a thetic judgment, however, would be one in 
which something is asserted, not to be like anything else or opposed to anything 
else, but simply to be identical with itself: thus it could presuppose no ground of 
conjunction or distinction at all: the third thing, rather, which as a matter of 
logical form, it must still presuppose, would be simply the requirement for a 
ground,”38 yet, “[t]he first and foremost judgment of this type is 'I am,' in which 
nothing whatever is affirmed of the self, the place of the predicate being left 
indefinitely empty for its possible characterization.”39 By this, it is clear that a 
thetic judgement is an infinite judgement concerning the real basis of all possible 
determination, an unreachable limit to which one can only approach endlessly. 
In this way, the Self must become more and more like the absolute Self as its 
source or being-in-itself: the Self must make an infinite effort to become identical 
to the establishing act, or the limit, that determines the interior. We therefore 
understand Fichte’s famous phrase about judgement, “man is free”: “ Man must 
approximate, ad infinitum, to a freedom he can never, in principle, attain.”40 
“Man is free” is thus not a synthetic judgement a priori, nor an analytic judgement, 
but a thetic judgement through which we aim at the highest thesis; it is that which 
one must strive to attain with infinite effort. Indeed, “man is free,” as a thetic or 
infinite judgement, signifies “man is not-free” given that liberty is the unattainable 
origin of all determined or finite beings. In this regard, it will be remembered that 
 
37 Ibid., p. 114. 
38 Ibid., p. 114. 
39 Ibid., p. 114. 
40 Ibid., p. 117.  
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the absolute self had been defined as a not-something, as a not-existing: man 
attaining absolute liberty would no longer be a thing or a determined being. Once 
more, then, infinite judgement, here as a thetic judgement, expresses an 
unattainable limit of knowledge that constitutes the basis of knowledge from the 
material position: it is through the free originary act that the Self and the 
establishing matter are brought into being. Thus, infinite judgement is, in part, 
the principle of transcendental logic–as that which addresses the absolute 
condition of all possible existence–but it is also that which addresses the condition 
of all possible determination as unknowable. The absolute Self is thus the pure 
indeterminable, the obscure and inaccessible source of all finite knowledge: 
human knowledge, then, is condemned to remain a non-knowledge, that is, finite 
rather than absolute knowledge. In refusing to accept that absolute knowledge 
will remain inaccessible to us, Hegel will be forced to refuse the validity of 
transcendental logic and infinite judgement.   
HEGEL AND INFINITE JUDGEMENT AS NON-SENSE  
Hegel’s ambitious project is to demonstrate the possibility of absolute knowledge 
as produced by a philosophical history in which the systems of Kant and the post-
Kantians were no more than steps. According to Hegel, his predecessors 
understood something fundamental–they understood the role of the subject in 
the construction of the object—but they remained unable to surpass the 
opposition between subject and object. Thus, knowledge remained limited to the 
domain of phenomena without being able to access things in themselves, which 
constituted both the limit and the condition of all knowledge. The issue, therefore, 
is to denounce the error implied by this perspective, which resides in the 
separation between transcendental and formal logic, or in the presupposition that 
a judgement consists of a conceptual a priori synthesis that can only be legitimized 
a posteriori by corresponding with its given material. Now, by designating form and 
matter to be two heterogeneous components, Kant and the post-Kantians had 
been incapable of legitimizing differentiable representation because that 
depended, ultimately, on an interminable, even indeterminate, absolute (the 
famous ‘night in which all cows are black’). Thus, matter remained in an 
unsurpassable state of alterity in relation to understanding, and it could only be 
indicated in an infinite judgement indicating the non-identity of the subject and 
object, given, in Hegel’s view, their irresoluble contradiction. To resolve this 
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contradiction implies, on the one hand, reaching the identity of the subject and 
object and, on the other, disqualifying infinite judgement by showing that it 
depends on a poor conception of the infinite as that which extends beyond the 
bounds of the determinate. Hegel thus engages in a profound transformation of 
logic and aims, against his predecessors, to show that formal synthesis does not 
need to rely on the transcendental logic that supplied, in a mysterious way, 
differentiated matter, i.e., for sensible intuitions to be subsumed under the 
concept. His point of departure consists of noting that to think does not mean, as 
the Kantians had believed, joining diverse elements under a given concept, but 
rather dividing the original unity of the concept in order to reach the 
consciousness of the identity of the Idea and of whoever thinks it; in other words, 
of infinite understanding and of finite understanding, the absolute Self and the 
transcendental self. Thus, synthesis would be based on unity of concept and 
knowledge would be the historical process through which original unity is 
reconstituted in a reconciliation of the opposites which derive from the activity of 
reflection. Following this perspective, which is evident in The Science of  Logic,41 to 
think does not consist of representing something that would be other than 
thought, but of understanding the rules through which thought is realized as 
knowledge or as a rational construction of the real. As a consequence, that which 
we believed about an object, as opposed to the subject, only relies on the concept: 
the object in judgement is the singular realization of the universal. In adopting 
this perspective, there is no need to postulate an unknown source of the matter of 
representation (thing in itself) over which the conceptual ritual would be applied 
to produce phenomena, but it suffices to understand the matter of judgement as 
that which is posed by a concept in a concept, even the singularization of the 
universal. The thing in itself is then only the concept in its universality, while what 
we thought were subjective representations were only determinations of the 
universal in judgement. To understand how Hegel gets rid of transcendental logic 
and infinite judgement in order to establish access to the idea as an intelligible 
source of all reality, we will now explore the given examples in the section on 
judgement of conceptual logic.42 
In the positive judgement “the rose is red,” we usually think of a connection 
 
41 Hegel, The Science of Logic, trans. and ed. George Di Giovanni, Cambridge, UK, Cambridge 
University, Press, 2010. 
42 Ibid. 
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between the subject (the rose) and the predicate (the color red). It is a question of 
showing the necessity of this judgement without, however, making the attribute 
into one possible determination of the thing in itself which is the rose; in other 
words, one must avoid the insufficient solution posed by Kant which consisted of 
making the rose’s reality a sum of its qualities. From this perspective, which 
considers matter, the rose would be the universal determined by the attribute, 
which can be expressed in this way: the universal is singular. However, Hegel notes 
that in reality, in this judgement, we subsume the rose, as a singular noun, under 
the universal concept expressed by the attribute ‘red,’ as a singular name; this 
means that the singular is universal. Thus, “the rose is red” means that the universal 
(red) is here determined as the red of the rose (rather than the red of an apple, for 
example), and is thus singular. Nevertheless, to have a judgement, it is necessary 
that a singular should be linked to a universal; it follows that “the singular is 
singular” does not make sense, is not a judgement. Until this point, then, we 
remain in a separation between the perspective of content, the universal is singular, 
and that of form, the singular is universal, which leads us to apply a not-identity of 
the subject and the predicate. Positive judgement thus becomes a negative 
judgement, “the rose is not red” or “the rose is not-red,” meaning that there is no 
identity between the subject and the predicate. Consequently, positive judgement 
finds its truth expressed not only in opposition, but also in relation to 
contradiction between the subject and the predicate: the universal is not singular, 
the singular is not universal. Hegel emphasizes that one must not consider 
negative judgement, which is expressed as both “the rose is not red” and “the 
rose is not-red,” as an infinite judgement in the Kantian sense. In negative 
judgement, in fact, we express a connection between the subject and the predicate 
and an effective determination. “The rose is not red” or “the rose is not-red” 
means that the rose has a color, although this color is not red; the negative 
judgement affirms the connection between the singular noun and the universal 
sphere of color. Not-red, then, does not mean that we are in a state of complete 
indetermination according to which the rose would be open to all possible 
determination with the exception of the determination of being red, as Kant 
would have it, but that the rose could be white or yellow, for example. The next 
step is to consider the truth of the negative, which expresses the opposition 
between subject and predicate in order to overcome this opposition in a unity 
 MADELEINE COLLIER & EKIN ERKAN 409 
that justifies the validity of the judgement. This allows us to avoid verifying our 
consideration as based merely on the idea of the rose’s being as equal to the sum 
of its possible determinations. To do this, Hegel demonstrates that, in judgement, 
the concept of the rose is specified as potentially having different determinations, 
as potentially becoming or passing through a plurality of determinations rather 
than as a non-being of the determinable (the not-determined). The unity of 
concept, which justifies the relation of terms in the judgement, is thus reinstated: 
that the rose is red means that there is an identity of red and of the rose in the 
existence or particular realization of the concept. The universal concept, rose, is 
realized in its particular determinations as judgement, or in a series of necessary 
judgements (the rose is red, white, or yellow since it ‘becomes,’ that is, it is realized 
in different ways). The rose is identified as red, the redness of the rose, and thus 
there is an identity between subject and predicate in the unity of concept. The 
resulting concept is the ‘good infinity,’ the determined unity of opposites, and this 
justifies the connection of the subject ‘rose’ and predicates like ‘red,’ ‘white,’ or 
‘fragrant,’ which are true judgements, or singularizations/realizations of the 
universal.            
However, Hegel says that a judgement of the type “the rose is an elephant” is 
an infinite judgement that addresses the ‘bad infinity,’ that is, the indeterminate 
as unlimited sum of all possible reality. In this judgement, which must be 
considered as lacking sense, we express the incommensurability of the sphere of 
the being of one thing with the sphere of being of the other, rather than the unity 
of opposites in the concept. A significant example of infinite judgement is a crime 
that is situated outside the sphere of the good infinity of the law. In a dispute, for 
example, the ownership of an object is contested and re-established by the law 
within the legal sphere; by contrast, theft, as a crime, consists of acting outside 
the legal sphere, it consists of positing an exterior sphere irreducible to law, the 
not-law as negation of the law. Hegel insists on the non-sense of infinite judgement 
and on its poor characterization as the negation of reason; that is, as a negation 
of the absolute identity of the Idea. Infinite judgement addresses an irreducible 
exteriority which claims to deny the positive absolute of the mind by opposing it 
to non-being or to the negative being in absolute sense (not dialectic-able). 
Another example of infinite judgement offered by Hegel is “+1-1=0,” for which 
we address the indeterminable non-being as a sum of opposites; which is to say, 
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the bad infinity that constitutes the basis of transcendental logic (according to 
Fichte, for example, the reality of the self (+1) and the reality of the not-self (-1) 
share the total reality of the absolute Self (0) as their grounds of pure 
determination; the indeterminate non-being serves as a condition of existence of 
each determined or reciprocally determined being). With infinite judgment, 
Hegel thus refuses transcendental logic, a logic of bad infinity expressing false 
judgements. Good logic is, by contrast, formal: it understands opposites as the 
possible realizations of the concept. To return to the last example, one should 
understand +1 and -1 as two singularizations of the concept 1, that is, as 
differences within the concept of 1, rather than as two opposites canceling each 
other out in an irreducible exteriority to the unity of concept, zero rendered 
empty. In making infinite judgement into a non-sense, Hegel thus excludes the 
possibility of referring to unknowable things in themselves: the reality situated 
outside the good infinity of the absolute mind, a determined infinity identical to 
the self-awareness of the mind that knows itself as Idea realizing itself in all reality. 
Indicating more the negative being than the dialectic-able contradiction of 
differences within the concept, infinite judgement is a concept Hegel incessantly 
ridicules in order to hide its destructive potential. It is therefore not surprising 
that Gilles Deleuze’s anti-Hegelian strategy consists of reprising infinite 
judgement and its ability to indicate difference in itself against the law of identity. 
DELEUZE AND THE NOT-BEING OF THE PROBLEMATIC 
In Difference and Repetition,43 Deleuze proposes an anti-Hegelian dialectic based on 
the idea of difference, a project which he continues in The Logic of  Sense.44 It should 
be remembered, in this regard, that his interpretation of The Science of  Logic was 
influenced by the commentary of Jean Hyppolite.45 Deleuze wrote:  
In the wake of this fruitful book by Jean Hyppolite, one might ask whether an 
ontology of difference couldn't be created that would not go all the way to 
contradiction, since contradiction would be less and not more than difference. 
Hyppolite says that an ontology of pure difference would restore us to a purely 
 
43 Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, trans. Paul Patton, London, The Athlone Press 1994. 
44 Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, trans. Mark Lester, London, The Athlone Press, 1990. 
45 Deleuze, “Jean Hyppolite's Logic and Existence” (1953), in Desert Islands and other Texts, Los Angeles, 
Semiotext(e), 2004. 
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formal and exterior reflection, and would in the end reveal itself to be an ontology 
of essence. However, the same question could be asked in another way: is it the 
same thing to say that Being expresses itself and that Being contradicts itself?46 
Deleuze’s philosophical project thus begins as an attempt to think of difference 
as the real source of what exists and the concepts of formal logic as those things 
which depend on it. By refusing the universalism and uniqueness of the Hegelian 
Idea, which resolves each contradiction in the identity of a process in which there 
is only becoming the same, Deleuze aims to establish the possibility of a repetition 
of difference. This facilitates a becoming which concerns the actualization of 
heterogeneous realities, which cannot be reduced to the unity of concept and 
which, consequently, are not found in a relationship of contradiction. In 
considering difference as a simple opposition to push to the point of 
contradiction–which opens up the possibility of surpassing identity–Hegel’s 
philosophy reduces any alternative deployment of identity to non-sense, 
preventing any other philosophical possibility of articulating the real.47 Hegel 
reduces difference to a difference in concept rather than that which falls outside 
of the concept. As we noted, it is in this sense that difference is addressed by 
Kantian and post-Kantian infinite judgement, which points towards the 
unknowable and the undetermined outside of the power of the concept and, at 
the same time, which alone can justify the use of concepts in formal logic. The 
question posed in Difference and Repetition is therefore the following: “what is the 
concept of difference - one which is not reducible to simple conceptual difference 
but demands its own Idea, its own singularity at the level of Ideas?”48 The sought 
difference is not that which concerns the various entities which we subsume under 
the same concept, e.g., the variation in possible reds of the rose. On the contrary, 
difference should be understood as the condition of actualization of the rose’s 
being-colored as a singular event which generates its own concept. Here, 
 
46 Ibid., p. 18. 
47 Contra the universal history of philosophy proposed by Hegel, which reduces all philosophy to 
a stage in the development of the same speculative system, we refer to the Dianoematics of 
Martial Gueroult, whose interpretation of Descartes, Maïmon and Spinoza was fundamental for 
Deleuze. It is a question of showing the genetic conditions of each philosophical system in its 
autonomy and singularity, avoiding conceiving it as contradictory truths that need to be 
overcome in the achievement of an absolute philosophy. 
48 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, p. 27.  
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difference is the appearance of what we do not yet have a concept for, that which 
has not already been understood in the space of possible determined experience 
by a given concept.  
For Deleuze, the question is one of reprising the transcendental logic of the 
post-Kantians, which concerns real objects’ conditions for existing as they are 
determined in consciousness. However, rather than conceive of difference as an 
undetermined non-identity, for example the not-identity of the determinable 
(infinite) and the determinate (finite) or as the not-identity of the absolute subject 
and of the knowing subject, Deleuze aims to render difference in itself as a 
singular and determined difference, the condition of beings. Indeed, Hegel 
reproached his predecessors for making the differentiated reality of the 
phenomenal world depend on the unknowable thing in itself, deprived of all 
determination—the ‘dark night’ of the undifferentiated. It is the undifferentiated 
non-being of the thing in itself (the sum equal to zero or the negative being) 
which, according to Hegel, is a consequence of the erroneous perspective of the 
‘bad infinity.’ Hegel opposes this to the ‘good infinity’ of the Idea, the originary 
unity of possible realizations as specifications already contained within the 
concept as differences. For Deleuze, the challenge is thus to indicate the ideal 
condition of the genesis of the real while avoiding rendering it as the difference 
of determinable undifferentiation in relation to determined beings. For Deleuze, 
this also means considering the ideal genetic condition as the identity of the Idea, 
which unfolds according to a necessary dialectic. It is a matter of affirming 
difference in a positive manner rather than as the difference between things and 
making the ideal genetic condition the object of infinite judgement rather than 
undifferentiated being. By acknowledging that the “‘non' in the expression 'non-
being' expresses something other than the negative,”49 Deleuze considers that the 
Idea is the problem, in the mathematical sense, where the solutions come from. 
In this way the non-being is not the undifferentiated, but the problematic being 
as differentiated and yet non-identical to the solutions that it renders possible. As 
we can read in Difference and Repetition: 
Being is also non-being, but non-being is not the being of the negative; rather, it is 
the being of the problematic, the being of problem and question. Difference is not 
 
49 Ibid., p. 63. 
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the negative; on the contrary, non-being is Difference: heteron, not enantion. For 
this reason non-being should rather be written (non)-being or, better still, ?-being.50 
The genetic condition of determined beings in consciousness is thus the not-
being of the problem which is not pure nothingness, or indeterminate, but which, 
while being determined, makes possible the realization of its solutions in their 
singular determination (differentiation). The solutions differ from the problem, 
which cannot be reduced to the sum of its solutions. Following the mathematical 
philosophy of Albert Lautman, Deleuze remarks:  
A problem does not exist, apart from its solutions. Far from disappearing in this 
overlay, however, it insists and persists in these solutions. A problem is determined 
at the same time as it is solved, but its determination is not the same as its solution: 
the two elements differ in kind, the determination amounting to the genesis of the 
concomitant solution.51 
In sum, the Idea is the problematic being, the not-being as the actualizing 
condition of solutions. However, thus conceived, the Idea is always already 
determined since the problem has determined conditions. As Deleuze describes 
it, Hegel’s dialectic is only a distortion of the true dialectic, which progresses from 
the conditions of the problem to the generated solutions.  
Problems are always dialectical. This is why, whenever the dialectic 'forgets' its 
intimate relation with Ideas in the form of problems, whenever it is content to trace 
problems from propositions, it loses its true power and falls under the sway of the 
power of the negative, necessarily substituting for the ideal objecticity of the 
problematic a simple confrontation between opposing, contrary or contradictory, 
propositions. This long perversion begins with the dialectic itself, and attains its 
extreme form in Hegelianism.52 
By disqualifying transcendental logic in favor of formal logic, Hegel’s dialectic 
elides the true genetic conditions (Ideas as problems) of real beings to concern 
itself only with the proposals expressing these solutions. In other words, Hegel’s 
dialectic engenders beings as not determined in existence but only through 
language, as the realizations of the concept. The Hegelian spirit says what it is 
and is what it says. Now, for Deleuze, the dialectic is a matter of substituting a 
 
50 Ibid., p. 64. 
51 Ibid., p. 163. 
52 Ibid., p. 164. 
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pre-subjective problem, in which any particular subjectivity is only a matter of 
solution, for the question by which the Hegelian subject interrogates herself. The 
problem is not the question posed by someone (a universal or individual subject), 
but the conduit through which an individual subject may emerge in its difference 
compared to the other types of solution and, thus, as a thing which is singularly 
faced with universal being. Differential calculus offers a Deleuzian problematic: 
“Just as we oppose difference in itself to negativity, so we oppose dx to not-A, the 
symbol of difference [Differenzphilosophie] to that of contradiction.”53 The problem 
would thus consist in the distribution of differential relations (singularities) dx/dy, 
relations that indicate the limit of 0/0, and in which solutions would be obtained 
through integration. All real existence is thus a solution to the differential 
problem.  
Thus the ideal connections constitutive of the problematic (dialectical) Idea are 
incarnated in the real relations which are constituted by mathematical theories and 
carried over into problems in the form of solutions. We have seen how all three of 
these aspects were present in the differential calculus: the solutions are like the 
discontinuities compatible with differential equations, engendered on the basis of 
an ideal continuity in accordance with the conditions of the problem.54 
As it was for Maïmon, existence is a question of making the determination of 
objects depend on the consciousness of the integration operation of ideal 
differentials. However, the thing which, for the post-Kantians, remained the 
object of an infinite understanding, here becomes rationally accessible as the 
problem. It is no longer a matter of addressing, through infinite judgement, the 
not-identity of the ideal determinable (the thing in itself, absolute subject) and of 
the real determined (the phenomenon, finite subject), but of the difference in itself 
as a problem which does not resemble its solutions. Consequently, the subject 
emerges not as a determined being which differs from the non-being of the 
absolute subject, but as a series of intensive differences that depend on the relation 
dx/dy, of the determined Idea, or the specific condition of the problem, which 
differs through the nature of its solutions. For Deleuze, the problem is neither the 
Idea of the totality of the possible in divine, infinite understanding, nor the Idea 
of the totality of possible and contradictory determinations through which the 
 
53 Ibid., p. 170. 
54 Ibid., p. 179. 
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absolute subject passes. Rather, it is through variation that the problem permits 
the actualization of heterogeneous and non-contradictory possibilities, of singular 
subjectivities that we cannot subsume under a universal identity.  
Infinite judgement, which Hegel reduced to non-sense, is transformed and 
employed by Deleuze to indicate difference in itself, the ideal (virtual) problem 
that alone guarantees the right to existence of the singularity that resists the 
universal. This difference in itself contests the unitary sphere of the good infinity 
of the Idea in the absolute subject. We thus understand the political scope of the 
Deleuzian position: 
It is in terms of this image that everybody knows and is presumed to know what it 
means to think. Thereafter it matters little whether philosophy begins with the 
object or the subject, with Being or with beings, as long as thought remains subject 
to this Image which already prejudges everything: the distribution of the object and 
the subject as well as that of Being and beings. We may call this image of thought a 
dogmatic, orthodox or moral image.55 
Thus, it seems urgent to me today, faced with the universalist vocation of 
logic, to bring out the power (pouvoir) of infinite judgment and transcendental logic 
in order to address a different problem, which is capable of allowing the 
heterogeneous to emerge. As Deleuze said, “Contradiction is not the weapon of 
the proletariat but, rather, the manner in which the bourgeoisie defends and 
preserves itself, the shadow behind which it maintains its claim to decide what 
the problems are. Contradictions are not 'resolved,' they are dissipated by 
capturing the problem of which they reflect only the shadow.”56 
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